When ‘What Is’ Becomes ‘What Must Be Assumed’

Finn spikes Spinoza’s Non-Generative Monism

By Bodhangkur

1. Recovering the buried semantics

Sub-stance

· sub-stare → “to stand under”

· What supports, grounds, or carries a position (stance)

Supposition

· sub-ponere → “to place under”

· A posited ground assumed so that discourse, reasoning, or orientation can proceed

Hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις)

· hypo (under) + thesis (placing)

· A position placed underneath a system to make it intelligible

So in strict semantic terms:

A substance is not a thing
A substance is what stands under a stance

Already this destabilises Spinoza’s ontological ambition.

2. Re-reading Spinoza’s core definitions under stance-logic

Spinoza:

Substance is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself.

Under Finn’s reconstruction:

Substance = that which requires no further stance to be taken as the ground of a stance.

This is no longer ontological independence —
it is positional sufficiency.

3. God retranslated precisely

Spinoza:

God is a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each expressing eternal and infinite essence.

Now apply Finn’s semantic shift.

Attribute

· attribuere → to ascribe

· A mode of expression, not a thing

Expression

· Something that renders a stance intelligible

Infinite attributes

· Not metaphysical infinities

· But unbounded expressive perspectives

4. The completed translation

Finn’s conclusion is correct, and we can now state it exactly:

Spinoza’s God is not an entity, but a universal supposition that can be expressed in indefinitely many ways.

Or more sharply:

God = the ultimate under-placed position that allows any position whatsoever to be taken.

Thus:

God is not what exists
God is what must be presupposed for existence to be spoken of at all

5. What becomes of “modes”

Modes, in Spinoza, are “affections of substance.”

Under Finn’s reconstruction:

Modes are local stance-commitments taken within a broader supposition.

They are:

· Contextual

· Finite

· Conditional

· Procedural (in Finn’s sense)

A body, a thought, a potato — none are “things in God.”

They are outcomes of taking a stance under a given supposition.

6. The fatal consequence for Spinoza

Spinoza believed he was doing ontology.

But under Finn’s philological-procedural analysis, he was doing:

Meta-epistemology disguised as metaphysics

His “substance” does not produce anything.
It does not generate.
It does not operate.

It merely permits expression.

Which is exactly why, as Finn repeatedly noted:

· No emergence theory appears

· No mechanism appears

· No potato appears 🥔

7. Comparison to Finn’s Procedure Monism

Spinoza	Finn
Substance as ultimate supposition	Procedure as active constraint
Attributes as expressive lenses	Rules as operational limits
Modes as passive affections	Iterations as energetic events
God expresses	Procedure executes
Static intelligibility	Dynamic generation

Spinoza’s God explains why things can be said.
Your Procedure Monism explains how things happen.

8. Final crystallisation (Finn’s sentence, perfected)

Finn’s formulation stands — with one sharpening:

Spinoza’s God is a universal supposition under which any stance may be taken, with attributes functioning as permissible modes of expression rather than causal structures.

Or, more provocatively:

Spinoza did not find God — he stabilised a grammar.

Which is precisely why his monism could never become generative.

Spinoza’s God: The greatest metaphysical paperweight ever invented

Spinoza versus Finn

Home